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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Zimbabwe’s mineral sector has been the major contributor of the national economy’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) since the economic meltdown post land reform programme. The 
scale of the crisis resulted in the adoption of the multicurrency system in 2009. In an 
attempt to save the economy from total collapse the government has turned to the mining 
sector to establish linkages through mineral beneficiation. This study has analysed whether 
the creation of linkages in the mineral sector, through beneficiation and value addition, 
could resuscitate the economy. Literature on natural resources shows that countries that are 
resource-rich experience slow growth rates than resource-poor countries. The study found 
that mineral resource dependency could be a platform or foundation for economic growth 
and developmental opportunities through linkages creation in the mineral sector. However, 
resource-based development strategy is a challenging development path that needs a strong 
state with vested capacity to actively direct and co-ordinate economic transformation 
through deepening of the resource sector. Political tensions in Zimbabwe are the overriding 
obstacles to economic linkages creation in the mining sector and across other sectors. It is 
therefore, imperative to understand the socio-economic and political dynamics and 
interactions that influence and shape policy decisions, implementation and their outcomes 
in order for Zimbabwe to optimise economic linkages and revive its economy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background Context 
 
Zimbabwe is endowed with abundant mineral resources (African Development Bank 
Group, 2013), and like most Sub-Saharan African countries, it is dependent on 
primary production for exports and economic growth (Chamber of Mines, 2009). 
Throughout the country’s history, mining activities have been practiced including 
artisanal mining in gold. However, some of the vast minerals are not fully exploited 
due to lack of infrastructure and capital (Chamber of mines, 2013). The economic 
deterioration of Zimbabwe started in the early 2000 with the land redistribution 
process. The Land reform program presented enormous challenges as well as 
opportunities to the country’s leadership. One of the challenges was dealing with the 
rapid economic decline, which manifested in skyrocketing inflation rate.  
 
The country also started to lose comparative advantage in the agricultural sector due 
to chaotic land grabs and invasions mostly by war veterans that affected the country’s 
commercial farming sector. The land reform programme also resulted in unintended 
economic and political consequences (the rapid raise of the opposition party, 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) that attempted to muscle the ruling party, 
the Zimbabwe National African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) out of power, 
ultimately leading to the formation of an inclusive government in 2008 (Kisiangani, 
2009). The disruptions in industries and agricultural production resulted in 
significantly lower receipts from exports, the shutting down of industries and 
unemployment. The spiral of economic contraction resulted in decreased revenues 
and a lack of real money circulating in the economy and overall macroeconomic 
instability, ultimately forcing the economy to adopt a multicurrency system (Chamber 
of Mines, 2013). This policy response as well as loans and mineral revenues from 
China managed to turn the economy around as shown in figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Zimbabwe GDP Growth 
  
Source: WB data online 2015. 
 
However, despite the “look East’ policy, the mounting economic problems and 
political tensions that followed the land redistribution programmme proved difficult 
for the Zimbabwean government to completely revive its agriculture although some 
pockets of success start to emerge (Hanlon, Manjengwa & Smart, 2013).  Against this 
background, this study analyses how the mineral sector can become the cornerstone 
for an economic turnaround in Zimbabwe.  
 
Literature on mineral resource abundance and economic development points to the 
resource ‘curse’ associated with mineral dependency that causes negative correlation 
between mineral dependency and economic GDP growth rates in commodity-
dependent countries. (Sachs & Warmer, 1995), However, other studies have 
challenged this conclusion by Sachs and Warmer contending that natural resource can 
be a ‘blessing’ as the development experience of other countries (United State, 
Sweden and Finland) show. Commodity dependency was an anchor to industrial 
development in these economies. (Campbell, 2010) (Collier & Goderis, 2007), 
(Rosser, 2006).  While this study focuses on mineral resource it excludes oil and gas, 
which are beyond the limited scope of the study. Growing research on mineral 
resources and economic growth across mineral-rich countries has led to new ideas and 
perspectives for harnessing mineral the resources towards sustainable growth. 
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(Campbell, 2010), (Commission of Africa, 2003). The thesis statement for this study 
is that the beneficiation of mineral resources in Zimbabwe can resuscitate the 
economy because mineral resources play a transformational role of creating linkages 
and diversification. Properly and sustainably extracted, resources can be the backbone 
of economic growth and development. 
 
1.2. Brief Introduction of Zimbabwe’s Mineral Sector.  
 
Zimbabwe has a diverse mining sector with more than forty different minerals 
(Mhembere, 2009), and with the increasing demand for primary mineral commodities 
in the open-integrated world economy, mineral export revenues have remained a 
larger share of GDP.   The mining sector contributes a significant share of (GDP) to 
the economy although the agriculture sector remains the major contributor since 
independence in 1980 up until the early 2000s (Hawkins, 2009). Given the decline in 
the agriculture production and the on-going fiscal problems, the government now 
seeks to optimise the minerals sector in order to revive the economy. This policy shift 
has coincided with, and is spurred by the discovery of diamond deposits in Marange 
in 2006 and in other parts of the country (Sibanda & Makore, 2013) and the 
development of the Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) resources (from 2002). In 2011, 
Zimbabwe’s mineral output amounted to about 7% of the world's diamond production 
(by volume), 5% of the world's platinum production, and about 4% of the world's 
palladium output (Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe).  
 
Recently, a plethora of policy instruments have been developed to regulate the mining 
industry in a bid to stimulate economic growth and recovery as well as redress 
historical injustices of the colonial era that excluded blacks from mainstream 
economy (Chamber of Mines: 2009). These include the Minerals Development Policy 
developed in 2013, the Diamond Policy Act adopted in 2012, the Mines and Minerals 
Amendment Bill of 2010, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 
adopted in 2008 and the Sovereign Wealth Act, that provides for the establishment of 
a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) among others. Theoretically, the Draft Minerals 
Development Policy addresses the major issues to be tackled by various government 
ministries. These include sound structures of rents capture or taxation system, 
redeployment of these rents, the creation of a sovereign wealth fund, a community 
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fund, and the creation of government institutions that are responsible for investment 
in the mining sector.  
This policy will replace the old colonial mineral policy framed in the Mines and 
Mineral Act that was enacted in 1961 (Dhliwayo, 2014). The Mines and Minerals Act 
is now out-dated and disempowering as it was biased towards a small privileged 
settler population (“claims” system). The draft policy is an acknowledgement that the 
colonial policy had outlived its purposes and now is time to put more emphasis on 
reinvestment or deployment of the resource rents into the economy. The draft also 
aims to promote the expansion and integration of large and small sectors through 
linkages to sustain domestic production. The Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] deals mainly with the issue of mining rights while 
enabling increased local participation as all foreign companies should cede 51% of 
equity to indigenous Zimbabweans (Chamber of Mines, 2009). Locally, the policy 
framework is regarded as a progressive economic development instrument, but 
internationally it has been received with mixed reactions. Capital interests look at it as 
expropriation and in violation of international investment protection regimes. In 
principle, the policy aims to redress historical injustices and empower historically 
disadvantaged local investors to participate in the mainstream economy. The problem 
with this policy lies in its implementation as elaborated in Chapter 5. 
  
The new thinking in transforming the mining industry is also reflected in the 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) 
(2013-2018). This crucial policy blueprint was developed in 2013 by government and 
it emphasises beneficiation and value addition not only for higher returns but also as a 
strategy to promote industrialisation and economic growth. ZimAsset is paramount to 
the mining industry as it highlights that the debate in the resource extraction sector is 
moving beyond export revenues to beneficiation and value addition (Chamber of 
Mines, 2013). These policy instruments are a step further towards economic recovery, 
but what is uncertain is whether there are sufficient policy strategies and capital to 
promote effective implementation. Thus, the policy reforms have not yet stimulated 
significant mining-led development. Implementation is key to reviving investment 
and growth in the minerals sector, especially in the current political milieu in the 
country. 
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Persisting political unpredictability and policy uncertainty in Zimbabwe are likely to 
hinder the successful establishment of the aforementioned economic linkages. 
Relative political instability and economic decline that started with the land reform 
program in the early 2000 have resulted in policy inconsistencies and weak legal and 
institutional frameworks that have reduced investor confidence in the mining sector 
(Hawkins, 2009), (Sibanda & Makore, 2013). The so-called “smart sanctions” or trade 
sanctions imposed by the West, in particular, the United States (US) and the European 
Union (EU) on Zimbabwe have fuelled the political and economic problems as the 
country cannot borrow from, or trade with the West. 
This study unpacks the potential for Zimbabwe’s mineral endowment to catalyse 
sustainable economic recovery and growth by creating economic linkages (upstream, 
downstream, spatial, fiscal and knowledge) in the mineral resource sector. The study 
looks at some key mineral resources, which include platinum group metals (PGMs), 
iron ore, coal, chromium, nickel, steel, copper, gold, and diamonds. Diversification in 
minerals makes economic sense rather than relying solely on a single commodity. 
Wright and Czelusta (2003) note that “excessive reliance on a single commodity for 
export earnings is unwise, especially if the market in question is volatile and if it 
provides the major source of government revenues...” Hence this study focuses on 
different mineral resources.  
	  
1.3 Research Problem / Problem Statement  
 
This study critically analyses whether the establishment of mineral-based linkages in 
mining sector can contribute to economic recovery in Zimbabwe. Following the 
steady decline in agriculture production, partly due to the land reform program of 
2000 to 2010, mineral extraction has become a focus for economic growth. Currently 
mining has replaced agriculture as the major contributor to the country’s GDP through 
export revenues and taxes such as royalties and corporate tax. In order for Zimbabwe 
to successfully revive its economy, once the breadbasket of Southern Africa, the 
government must leverage its mineral extraction sector so that it becomes a platform 
for broader economic growth.  
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The current political climate, energy constraints and fiscal problems in Zimbabwe 
pose a major threat to the optimisation of the mineral sector to achieve economic 
recovery. Failure to transform and create economic linkages with the mining sector 
will imply that economic recovery will not be met. Studies have shown that resource 
rich countries, particularly in Africa, have been associated with low economic growth 
levels and development due to the resource curse thesis, corruption, and rent-seeking 
behaviour. (Collier & Goderis, 2007) (Rosser, 2006). Although the resource curse 
thesis associated with mineral rich countries has been widely documented, there is 
limited research on how to optimise the mineral sector in order to address or minimise 
the resource curse problem and achieve economic development. Recent literature 
(such as (Smillie, 2009), (Hawkins, 2009) and other Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGO)) has focused on the issue of government transparency and accountability on 
rents capture without necessarily nailing or providing possible solutions for the 
country to benefit from mining extraction and use the sector as a base load growth 
tool for economic recovery. 	  
	  
1.3. Research Question 
 
The key question in this research is: how can Zimbabwe leverage its mineral 
resources for sustainable economic recovery and growth? 
  
1.3.1 Sub-Questions 
 
a) What is the relationship between mineral resources and economic growth? 
b) How does the minerals sector offer opportunities for upstream, downstream 
and side-stream industrialisation (economic linkages including  beneficiation)? 
c) How does the problem of political economy affect the growth of the mining 
sector in Zimbabwe?  
	  
1.4. Rationale or Significance of the study 
 
There has been limited research in Zimbabwe on how the minerals sector can be 
leveraged as a launchpad for sustainable economic growth and broader development 
so that these extractive resources can be converted into other forms of capital that 
move the country into other development activities. The revived intellectual interest in 
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mining activities, around beneficiation in Africa, juxtaposed with a persistent 
economic decline in Zimbabwe underscores the significance of this study. The study 
contributes to the existing literature on minerals extraction and economic 
development. 
1.6. Research Aims and Objectives  
 
The purpose of this study is to explain and understand how mineral resource 
extraction can be optimised for the recovery and growth of the Zimbabwean 
economy. The main objective is to critically analyse the challenges and opportunities 
of resource extraction, and suggest alternative pathways to incentivise economic 
linkages. The study contributes to the knowledge gap in the literature on mineral 
resources (debate on resource curse and economic growth) and more importantly, to 
the national debate on the alternative paths available for Zimbabwe’s economic 
recovery. The target audience of this research are academics, government policy 
makers, students and other mining stakeholders. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
  
This research employed a qualitative-analytical approach of semi- structured 
interviews to address the research question. Qualitative research methodology refers 
to research that relies on descriptive data. This approach is mostly interpretive rather 
than scientific. According to Schwandt (2001), qualitative researchers seek meaning 
of human action. The qualitative methodology approach was preferred because it 
allows one to investigate the ‘how and why’ questions in decision-making which 
allows for in-depth analysis. Although this approach is limited by subjectivity, it is 
also theoretically generalizable. 
 
1.8. Data collection instruments 
 
The data collection methods used to carry out the study are semi-structured interviews 
for gathering primary data and desktop data analysis. The in-depth semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with government officials, government policy makers, and 
academic experts in the mining and mineral resources field. The research used semi-
structured interviews, which are significant tools for getting factual data and valuable 
information from the context of participants’ experiences, and to allow respondents to 
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express their knowledge and insights in their own frameworks. Structured interviews 
and observations for instance were not chosen as they are limited in terms of getting 
more information. Observations only provide the meaning but do not explain why the 
situation or the economic status is like that for example. Thus, observations often 
paint a picture that is based on subjectivity. While quantitative methodology is seen as 
objective, is does not adequately address the why question. In addition, the use of 
mathematics and statistical numbers in quantitative methodology can be bias if the 
figures are not carefully disaggregated.  
 
Government ministries and civil society organisations that were contacted for 
interviews (data collection) are as follows: the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe 
(COMZ), the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, the Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corporation (ZMDC), Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), the 
Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU), the Institute of Mining 
Research (IMR), Protect All Children Today (PACT), Zimbabwe Environmental Law 
Association (ZELA), the National Mines Workers Union of Zimbabwe (NMWUZ). 
 
The research also used other primary data that has been already collected. This 
primary data was accessed from government policy and statistical documents and 
other relevant institutions. The study also made use of secondary data such as books, 
scholarly journals, articles, and online sources to interpret, critic and supplement 
primary data. Secondary data is necessary for this study as it help to provide 
analytical views, explanation and understanding of the debate around resource led 
economic development and resource curse thesis particularly in Africa. Secondary 
data analysis also helps remedy bias from interview participants. 
 
This study employed a qualitative analysis approach in order to gain insights of how 
to leverage the mineral sector for economic recovery and to acquire a critical 
understanding of the political economy of resource based economic growth and 
development. A number of official government documents including budget 
statements will be analysed to establish the production and revenues changes in the 
mining sector. The UN country development reports, World Bank reports and the 
statements from the treasury were also analysed to produce a research report that 
addressed also the political dimensions of establishing mineral – based linkages rather 
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than showing the economic technical aspects only. The research outline is discussed 
below. 
  
1.9. Outline of the study 
 
Chapter 2 of this study analyses the literature on mineral resource dependence and 
slow economic growth (resource curse thesis). The chapter start by discussing the 
neo-classical perspective of resource curse in mineral rich countries. It will then 
proceeds to question the neo-classical analysis of natural resource dependence and 
slow growth In this regard, it identifies the gaps in the literature. Chapter 3 discusses 
the linkages theory from a political economy perspective. It analyses the rational for 
beneficiating the mineral resources and the role of the state in promoting beneficiation 
and diversification. In chapter 4 the study looks at policy space for beneficiation of 
mineral resources in Zimbabwe by analysing some of the policy initiatives adopted by 
the government. The chapter the goes on to analyse the political economy dynamics 
surrounding the linkages creation in mining industry and its effect on policy 
outcomes. Chapter 5 starts by providing an overview of Zimbabwe’s mining sector. 
This follows an analysis and discussion of upstream, downstream, side-stream 
linkages. It provides a conclusion from the insights gathered from the semi-
interviews. Chapter 6 summarises the findings of the study by tying together the 
theoretical and empirical strands of the study and provides a conclusion. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Context 
 
2.1. Theoretical and analytical framework 
 
The theoretical framework underpinning this study is that mineral resources can be a 
‘blessing’ and can steer economic development and sustainable growth by creating 
linkages with other productive sectors, mainly the industrial and infrastructure sectors. 
The resource curse theory has an incredibly wide credence among neo-classical 
theorists, but the empirical evidence shown that there is no resource curse but rather, a 
capitalist crisis. Fine (2008) posits that capitalism is inherently unstable and therefore 
it needs constant monitoring. Modern industrial capitalism has produced exploitative 
structural economic relationships mainly between the resource-rich countries and the 
global mining companies that are driven by profit maximisation (Di John, 2011) 
(Barma, et al, 2010). Fine (1997) argues that the resource curse theory is “an 
ideological fix that seek to avert the crisis of legitimacy faced by capitalist 
development that is driven and pioneered by predatory MNCs and foreign investors”. 
Multinational companies constrain the autonomy of the state to purse their desired 
development path.  
 
The acknowledged importance of mineral extraction as a catalyst to economic 
development in Zimbabwe and the potential of the mining sector to foster 
development linkages, confirm the significance of this study. The research engages in 
both the neo-classical mainstream and political economy approaches to mineral-based 
development. The mainstream economic literature provides a theoretical analysis 
around the debate of the resource curse, the Dutch Disease, weak institutions, 
corruption, state capacity, and rent seeking behaviour. This literature review starts by 
analysing critically the debate on resource-dependency and economic stagnation from 
both neoclassical economic and political economy perspective. This is important in 
unpacking the resource curse thesis. This follows an evaluation of the contemporary 
literature on mineral led development through backward and forward linkages. Thus, 
the purpose of the literature review is to provide a comprehensive understanding and 
critique of the debates around mineral led development, in order to present more 
applicable solutions to escape the curse. This literature review contributes to building 
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an analytical policy capacity to challenge the conventional wisdom of the resource 
curse in resource-rich economies.  
	  
2.2. The neo-classical perspective: resource curse theory 
 
The history of resource dependency and structural change is rooted in the discovery of 
gas and how this affected industrial structure of the Netherlands and later the north 
sea oil and the United Kingdom. It is argued that these countries experienced 
economic stagnation especially in manufacturing sectors due to the resource booms 
that strengthened their domestic currency. This came to be known as ‘Dutch Disease’ 
whereby an appreciation of local currency due to resource boom undermined the 
productivity performance of traded sector as labour and capital is shifted to the 
mineral sector (Arezki &Van der Ploeg, 2007), (Di John, 2011), (Jourdan, 2012).  
 
The neo-classical theory assumes that resource-rich countries are unable to harness 
the wealth to boost economic growth since mining-led development is constrained by 
the Dutch disease, global price shocks in commodity markets, rent seeking behaviour, 
weak and corrupt government institutions, among other factors (Van der Ploeg, 2007). 
Mainstream theorists who viewed government intervention in the economy as bad for 
economic development also supported the resource curse theory. State interventions 
are seen as leading to price distortions, corruption and rent seeking behaviour 
(economic rents for the privileged few), which ultimately result in market 
disequilibrium (Smith, 2004).  
 
According to the neoclassical theorists, a viable way to abolish corruption and rent 
seeking behaviour for achieving rapid economic development was to roll back the 
state (Rapley, 2002; Fine, 1997). The state was to be replaced by functioning 
institutions. The establishment of institutions (both political and economic 
institutions) is seen as purposive as these institutions are supposed to be efficient-
maximising structures. The neoclassical theorists thus, overlook the problem of 
information asymmetries and inefficiencies inherent in some institutions. The idea 
that the state was distracting market operations were strengthened by the introduction 
of structural adjustment policies but the model however came with its own shortfalls 
(Rapley, 2002). 
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Literature on resource-based economic development dwells much on the idea that 
mineral activity or commodity production is an unsustainable short-term growth due 
to the inherently finite nature of the mineral activity (Di John, 2011) (Rosser, 2006). 
The main point on resource dependency literature is that natural resources are cursed 
hence governments especially in developing countries should exercise caution. Thus, 
since the mining industry is generally seen as an enclave sector that is capital 
intensive (of imported machinery and equipment) resulting in less division of labour, 
the creation of linkages with other sectors (such as manufacturing) becomes crucial. 
There is evidence to support that the manufacturing sector creates more backward and 
forward linkages than the primary sector. Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that more 
economic resources should be channelled towards the manufacturing sector since it is 
associated with learning-by-doing effects relative to primary sectors such as mining 
and agriculture  
The neo-classical theorists further assert that resource dependency or resource 
abundant economies experience poor growth performance due to corruption and weak 
institutions mostly in developing countries such as Latin American and African 
countries (Lane & Tornell, (1996) as cited in Arezki & Van der Ploeg, 2007, Di John, 
2011, Barma et al, 2012). They also argue that resource abundant economies are 
further susceptible to rent-seeking since the concentration of mineral wealth in either 
the private or public sector is in the hands of the few elites (small number of players). 
Therefore, it is argued that such high concentration of wealth or resource rents distract 
government attention away from long-term economic development goals towards rent 
seeking (Smith, 2004). However, Marxist theorist Paul Baran contributed to the 
debate by arguing that most poor countries with slow growth rates were dominated by 
local elites whose interests are not in line with national developmental goals but with 
those of the multinational companies (Di John, 2011). This can be seen in instances 
where the business elites and foreign multinationals favour certain policies, such as 
protectionist economic measures, capital flow deregulations or overvaluation of the 
local currency that function to maintain their dominant positions at the expense of 
society as a whole (Rosser, 2006). 
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Thus, Vatansever and Gillies (2009,15) provide a nice quote: 
“Despite the primacy of the state, all power does not rest with government officials and 
institutions. Rather, the ruling elite comprise individuals and groups both within and outside 
government who together assert a monopolistic control of wealth. In particular, a “class of 
rent-seeking pseudo-entrepreneurs” enjoys an umbilical relationship with the state. These 
business elites are intertwined in the state capture of resource rents and prove to be 
entrenched obstacles in the face of transformative measures. Together with this rent-seeking 
dynamic between political and economic elites, the intrusion of the state in the economy—as a 
result of its control over natural resource sector activities—blurs the distinction between 
public and private”. (Vatansever & Gillies, 2009:15 as cited by Barma et al, 2012: 49). 
 
Vatansever & Gillies, 2009 shed light on the overall debate on mineral extraction and 
mining-led development. The issue of rents capture must be analysed in detail as 
studies on mining activities have merely focused on corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviour by states and government officials while turning a blind eye on the 
operations of private business elites and multinational corporations.  
 
2.3. Questioning the resource curse model from a political economy perspective   
 
Some neoclassical theorists argue that natural resource abundance in general and oil 
wealth in particular is positively associated with slow economic development cross-
nationally. However, resource abundance may have both negative and positive effects 
in different environments, but this effect cannot be generalized across space and time 
(Smith and Kraus 2005; Dunning 2008). Dependency and structuralists theorists are 
well known opponents of natural resource export specialisation who argued that 
primary products were subject to declining terms of trade between the prices of 
commodities and those of manufactures (Prebisch & Singer, (1950) as cited in 
Kaplinsky, 2011:6). Dependency theorists also argued against commodities exports 
because of price volatility of raw materials (Di John, 2011:167). (Kaplinsky, 2011).  
 
Dependency theorists further posit that the domination of foreign multinational in 
natural resources extraction (particularly in developing countries) undermine mineral 
led development and growth efforts due to profit expatriation. The argument is that 
multinational investors have no incentive to reinvest their profits in the extractive 
country or in promoting national development goals of these economies since they are 
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merely profit driven (Di John, 2011) (Barma, et al, 2010). It is argued further by 
dependency theorists that resource abundance has compelled developing countries 
into the global capitalist system as the developed countries and MNCs scramble for 
access to their resources for their own economic development and capital 
accumulation respectively (Rosser, 2006:19.) This view is also shared by Amin, 
(2014) who argues that the integration of the developing countries into the global 
capitalist system is merely to maintain their current economic position, (commodity 
export-oriented economies) as suppliers of raw materials to the developed countries. 
Amin’s argument is that economic integration is important but the question that needs 
to be raised is not “to which degree the various regions are integrated, but in which 
way they are integrated” (Amin, 2014:29).  
 
Thus, the debate on resource dependency and resource curse poses serious policy and 
intellectual challenge. Although there are acknowledgements that resource curse 
theory undermines the pace of economic growth and development, there are serious 
disagreements on how to remedy the problem. Indeed it is not strategic to say that the 
solution to the resource curse problem is simply to ignore these natural endowments 
when most of African economies have a comparative advantage in mineral resources 
(Deaton, 1999 as cited in Lorentzen, 2006). Various studies establish the relationship 
between mineral resource abundance and levels of economic development, and they 
show that resource endowment is not always a ‘curse’ but can be a ‘blessing’  
(Arezki and Van der Ploeg, 2007), (Collier & Goderis, 2007). Although Campbell, 
(2010) asserts that the curse has been in the poor management of the exploitation of 
the resources, bad policies, corruption, lack of revenue transparency and leakages; Di 
John, (2011) and Gylfason, 2001 as cited in Lorentzen, (2006:3) put it another way. 
They suggest that poor growth performance is not explained by relative abundance of 
natural resources but by what a country does with it.  
 
2.4.Gaps in the literature / theoretical gaps 
 
First, the resource curse theory lacks a strong analysis of the underlying political and 
socio-economic factors that result in slow economic growth across countries due to 
historical consequences. Second, the theory does not stand the test of time, in which 
globalisation and economic integration have shaped the nature of international trade 
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and economic development, wrought by MNCs that are increasingly becoming 
powerful both economically and politically (Nkrumah, 1965), (Amin, 2014). Third, 
the resource curse theory emphasises that slow growth rates in mineral-rich countries 
are due to mineral price fluctuations (during boom and bust periods) while 
overlooking other important factors that causes fiscal instability such as high interests 
payments on foreign debts, trade sanctions and short-term capital flows. (Desker et al, 
2008).  
 
In addition, existing literature on mineral abundance and resource curse does not 
adequately address questions of how to manipulate state institutions towards resource-
based development (Rosser, 2006), (Campbell, 2010). The creation of production 
linkages through coordination and collaboration of industrial policies cannot be 
overemphasised. In this context, this study fills the important gap in literature in how 
the state intervenes using industrial policy, state capacity and political incentives for 
actors to commit to national vision of aligning mineral policies with long-term 
economic development goals. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
Be that as it may, it is clear that the process of achieving growth and economic 
development is dynamic and complex and it also involves prioritising which sectors to 
develop first that have higher linkages, with the strategic implementation of an 
industrial policy. The idea of resource-based strategy in Zimbabwe should be 
informed by the linkages theory. The mineral sector is important because it is a higher 
linkage sector that can be optimised to achieve economic recovery and sustainable 
growth. Unlike the neoclassical approach that focuses on fundamentals across the 
entire economy, the linkages theory acknowledges that growth is uneven or 
unbalanced and thus involves making priorities to meet specific developmental goals.  
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Chapter 3. The political economy perspective for leveraging the 
mineral sector 
 
Introduction  
 
While the above accounts on resource abundance and the Dutch disease offer 
plausible explanations to slow economic development in resource-rich countries, 
neither alone provides a satisfactory account of the entrenchment of natural resource 
dependence in developing countries. The literature overlooks the importance of 
different political, economic, and institutional legacies in colonised developing 
countries in general and Africa in particular that explain their slow rate of economic 
development. This study moves beyond the resource curse literature that emphasise 
anti-corruption, abolishment of rent-seeking behaviour, good governance, and 
institutional reforms (Collier, (2008). Mineral resource abundance interacts with 
several salient structural and institutional factors in shaping actors’ incentives, 
entailing different policy choices that ultimately produce different economic 
outcomes in Zimbabwe. The following sections of this chapter provide an analysis of 
linkages creation in the mineral sector from a political economy perspective.  
	  
3.1. The linkages theory 
 
This literature review on linkages provides an analysis to debunk the resource curse 
theory by arguing that the establishment of economic linkages are key to long-term 
economic diversification and development. This linkages theory provides an 
understanding of the necessary conditions under which resource-based development 
(and resource-abundant countries) eludes the curse. The idea of linkages was first 
coined by Albert Hirschman who identified three different types of linkages, which 
are: fiscal, consumptive, and production linkages (Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 
2012). According to Hirschman, fiscal linkages consist of resource rents from taxes 
and royalties, consumption linkages refer to the demand for the products from other 
sectors due to income rise in the commodities sector; and production linkages, which 
consist of forward and backward linkages (Jourdan, 2012), (Morris, Kaplinsky & 
Kaplan, 2012). The African Union in 2009 also adopted “The African Mining Vision” 
(AMV) that asserts the strategic mineral development and broad-based growth 
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facilitated by the creation of economic linkages. The AMV places mining in the 
context of broader development plans by emphasising the integration of mineral 
policy into development policy not only at local levels but also at national and 
regional levels (UNECA, 2011:113). The document also alludes to the importance of 
beneficiation and value addition of mineral resources to reach industrialisation stage 
that ultimately leads to sustainable growth. Figure. 2 below shows the economic 
linkages. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Establishing the resource linkages. 
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other	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  long-­‐term	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  physical	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Source: Jourdan, 2012. 
 
 
 
The figure above shows the five types of linkages that can be created in the mineral 
sector. Jourdan (2012), extending on the work of Hirschman (1981) observed that 
horizontal or side-stream linkages namely, knowledge and spatial are critical for 
insuring the development of other sectors and establishing cross-sector linkages that 
support economic diversification. Thus, side-stream linkages can be understood as 
support structures and industries that lay the foundation for the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of the mining industry. The following section looks at the 
composition of the aforementioned types of linkages. 
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I. Fiscal linkages – includes rents capture through Resource Rents Tax (RRT). 
These rents could be either direct (RRT, corporate tax) or indirect tax 
(royalties, export tax, etc) (UNECA & AU, 2011).  The resource rents can be 
used to promote industrial development in other sectors, that is reinvestment in 
domestic production and physical infrastructure development but can also be 
invested in funds such as Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). 
 
II. Backward/Upstream linkages – include the supply sector or inputs sector that 
feed into the mineral sector such as mining capital goods, consumables and 
service industries. (UNECA & AU, 2011), (Jourdan, 2012). 
 
III. Forward/Downstream linkages – includes mineral value addition in industries 
(beneficiation) through processing and refining, and even using minerals as 
inputs for local industries.  
 
IV. Knowledge linkages – consists of the development of human capital (for 
example, engineers, geologists) and technology development through 
Research & Development (R&D), universities and technical institutions. 
(Jourdan, 2012).  
 
V. Spatial linkages – include transport (roads, rail), water and energy 
infrastructure. It is argued that the mining sector depends and facilitates 
massive infrastructural systems that are significant for the development of 
other sectors such as agriculture and forestry (Jourdan, 2012), (UNECA & 
AU, 2011). 
 
The interplay and the articulation of these various linkages will promote and support 
productive capacities that are significant for long-term economic growth and 
recovery. 
	  
3.2. Building Linkages and promoting diversification 
 
According to Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, (2007), natural resource wealth is 
‘enclaved’ wealth because firstly, “the generation of natural resource wealth can occur 
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quite independently of other economic processes that take place in a country; … 
[Secondly], … natural resources … are non-renewable. …they are thus less like a 
source of income and more like an asset”. (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, (2007:4).  
 
The fact that natural resources are extracted, which is not a result of ‘production 
process’ per se means that there are less economic linkages with other productive 
sectors. Because of this unique nature of natural resources this study finds it necessary 
to analyse the idea of linkages creation to ensure that the economy continues to 
function when the resources are exhausted.  
 
3.2.1. Beneficiation and value addition of the mineral resources 
 
Despite the diversity of the mineral resource base in Zimbabwe, the contribution of 
the sector to broad-based economic development is limited by lack of downstream 
linkages and the value addition of mineral resources. Beneficiation is a downstream 
process of transforming raw minerals to a higher value semi-finished or finished 
product which can be exported or consumed locally (SIMS report, 2012). Value 
addition involves the process of enhancing the quality of the product. In general, 
beneficiation and value addition not only increase and stabilize the export value of 
mineral commodities, but also have a positive multiplier effect on the macro-
economy.  
 
This happens through employment creation, knowledge and capacity building in both 
upstream and downstream industries, industrialization and diversification of the 
economy  (UNECA, 2011), (Jourdan, 2012). Beneficiation is also critical in 
developing downwards linkages promoted by comparative advantage. The articulation 
of mining licence to include different beneficiation and value addition targets is 
evidence that countries are serious about creating linkages in the extractive industries 
as well as ensuring that the operations of private mining companies are aligned to 
national development interests. (UNECA, 2011). Horizontal linkages transform the 
process of production by linking up the mineral sector in facilitating the build-up of 
sound infrastructure and energy supply which are the pillars to long term economic 
development (Toledano et al, 2014),  (UNECA, 2011). Zimbabwe must create 
effective linkages so that the minerals extracted become feedstocks to the production 
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sectors like agriculture and the manufacturing. These linkages can be created through 
an industrial policy for the mining industry that is designed to suit the context, 
expectations, and capabilities of the country (UNECA, 2011).  
 
Beneficiation and value addition of minerals can also be analysed from the Global 
Value Chains (GVC) framework. The concept of GVC is tied to the World Bank 
discourse of export-led growth literature on the East Asian Miracle. The concept is 
premised on upgrading of the product by firms to improve technological efficiency 
and the quality of the final product. Thus, the GVC framework aims to upgrade 
product development throughout inter-sectoral upgrading and to improve access to 
global markets through design, marketing and branding of the product (Kaplinsky, 
(2010). The insertion of GVC into product development allows for the process of 
beneficiation and value addition to take place in mining industry and in other sectors. 
However, global value chains do not always result in upgrading. Multinational 
companies with economic power have no incentive to transfer upgrading skills to their 
supplier thereby restricting them from accessing global markets. The OECD (2014) 
report also noted that small developing countries face the challenge of ‘being locked 
in into low value-added stages of GVCs’ and ‘foreign investors operating in isolation 
with only limited spill overs to the domestic economy.’ Therefore, the important take 
away from the GVC analysis in connection with beneficiation and value addition is to 
place more emphasise on firms’ participation in national and regional value chains to 
establish strong trade linkages and structure before they enter global markets (OECD, 
2014). 
 
3.3. Industrial policy: The role of the state 
 
Industrial policy is a national strategy to reform the industrial structure of the country 
for achieving national developmental objectives and it is aligned with the country’s 
trade policy (Chang, 1998). Chang (1994: 60) defines industrial policy as policy 
aimed at specific industries to achieve positive performance and outcomes that are 
perceived as efficient by the state. Industrial policy clearly defines the role of the state 
that is beyond the facilitatory role to redistribute resources, giving fiscal incentives, 
setting targets and implementing coordinated policy measures (Chang, 1994). The 
literature on industrial policy identifies three categories of industrial policies: vertical 
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policies that target specific sectors, horizontal policies that influence each industry 
and structural policies which aim to promote a structural change in the economic 
activity (Fine, 1997). 
  
The rational behind industrial policy is that markets alone cannot address the 
developmental needs and economic gaps within a nation hence the need for the state 
to play a facilitatory role in stimulating economic growth as argued by Amsden, 
(1994) in her studies of the East Asian economies. She contends that “market forces 
cannot be relied upon to discipline business to act efficiently” (as cited by Tan Kock, 
in Fitzgerald, 1995:38). The argument is that, the state and market are intertwined; the 
markets provide natural economic incentives (that are arguably based on 
competitiveness), while the state will set the playing field, give incentives and provide 
regulatory frameworks through various forms of industrial policy. However, Evans 
(2012) argues that such a state should have an ‘embedded autonomy’ to successfully 
stimulate economic growth through industrial transformation and not to be 
manipulated by powerful rent-seeking elites. By ‘embedded autonomy’, he refers to 
the structure of the state and its relationship with the society. In addition, the 
implementation of the industrial policy is also important in optimising the mineral 
sector. This requires strategic policy coherence with other economic sectors and 
coordination of various departments and key institutions to effectively establish 
linkages and economic diversification.  
 
Mainstream neo-liberal economists view industrial policy as an undesirable policy 
option because of government interference in the economy. They argue that 
government intervention of ‘picking the industrial winners’ does not guarantee 
industrial success since there is no substantive criteria that determine which industries 
are more competitive than others. They contend that the role of the government 
should be limited to the establishment of laws and regulation for market operations to 
effectively take place. Active government intervention is seen as disruptive leading to 
inefficiency in resource allocation and disequilibrium prices (Chang, (1994). There is 
also a general view that foreign investors, like donors as well as international 
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are 
ideologically opposed to the idea of economic linkages formation as these fall under 
industrial policy and government intervention which therefore distort market oriented 
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macroeconomic frameworks. Buur et al. (2013) therefore observed that “it is a 
characteristic of the World Bank’s approach that the linkage issue is not given much 
attention in its advice and recommendations, possibly due to its aversion to industrial 
policy”. 
 
The debate on industrial policy is also controversial with different authors rhetorically 
emphasising different strands on how industrial policy should be articulated. Lin 
(2011b) narrows industrial policy by arguing that it should be aligned with the 
comparative advantage and current endowment of a country. Chang (2003) contend 
that industrial policy should be selective. A selective intervention strategy of 
industrial policy is important but the question remains whether the government is 
capable of ‘picking winners’, or do these selected sectors guarantee economic growth 
and development (Fine & Rustomjee, 1998:253). The debate on industrial policy has 
also been tied to the literature on developmental state that emphasises the political 
legitimacy and capacity of the state to actively intervene in directing the economy 
(Fine, 2010b) (Lin, 2011b). The major critic coming from the debate is that industrial 
policy has been used to fix what is already there and not necessarily to transform the 
structure of the economy.  Cassim, (2006) and Fine, (2010b) argue that the use of 
industrial policy has not provided a break away from original capitalist economic 
structure. Rather, it has to some extend strengthened and perpetuated the existing 
colonial structure of most industries like mining, manufacturing and financial sectors. 
In South Africa for example, Cassim, (2006) argues that the implementation of 
industrial policy has often reinforced the existing economic structure and growth 
through provisions of state-backed funding for capital-intensive mining and 
manufacturing sectors. Hence, it is imperative for Zimbabwe to implement industrial 
policy to strategically transform the economy, achieve economic recovery and 
sustainable growth. 
	  
 
3.4. Shifting from mineral resource dependence to industrialisation 
 
Zimbabwe is not industrialised relative to western countries and hence it is necessary 
to analyse the role of minerals in structural transformation and industrialisation. 
Beneficiation of mineral commodities is regarded as a viable path to industrialisation 
(Kalinsky, 2011). Industrialisation process can be understood as a production stage in 
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which countries shift their production systems from agrarian system to industrial 
economies that are characterised by use of advanced machinery, technological 
innovations. Lewis (1953) understood industrialisation as a production stage that is 
necessary for sustainable economic development and industrial diversification. Many 
developed states, between the period of 1940s and 1960s managed to develop their 
economies by actively pioneering and facilitating the emergence of industrialisation 
(Kiely, 1999:32). Kaldor (1978) sees the manufacturing sector is a key 
characterisation of industrialisation. He argues that manufacturing sector is an engine 
of growth and industrialisation in terms of absorbing labour, (both skilled and 
unskilled), skills creation through ‘learning by doing’, strong backward and forward 
linkages with other sectors and facilitating technological innovations. Kaldor’s work 
also provides similar insights with Hirschman regarding linkages creation. Both 
Kaldor and Hirschman share the same view that manufacturing sector has greater 
forward and backward effects than other sectors of the economy, and argue that 
forward linkages offer potential contribution to industrialisation in the manufacturing 
sector. Thus, mining activities have the potential for creating forward and backward 
linkages with the manufacturing sector through beneficiation of mineral resources 
(Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 2010). 
 
Studies also show that comparative advantage plays an important role of shifting 
economies from natural resource dependency to industrialisation. Ricardo coined the 
idea of comparative advantage in his attempt to explain trade theory. Trade theory 
rests on the assumption that each country has a comparative advantage in trade in 
relation to the rest of the world, and trade liberalisation and openness will allow 
specialisation in comparative advantage to take place. The Ricardian model of 
comparative advantage argues that countries will gain by specialising in the 
production of goods, which use their most abundant factor of production 
(Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001). The model is premised on the assumption that through 
trade liberalisation and openness, countries are able to generate positive growth 
results due to ‘static gains that arise from resource allocation by following 
comparative advantage. This assumption is based on the mainstream neo-classical 
idea of market perfection.  
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The adoption of new technologies is crucial in turning a country’s comparative 
advantage into a competitive advantage such as new skills, technological information 
and lower inputs costs.  During the industrial revolution technological innovations of 
advanced machinery greased the wheels of industrialisation by promoting innovation 
and increasing production efficiency particularly in manufacturing sector. Foreign 
Direct Investments and (MNCs) are global actors that facilitate technology transfer 
within countries, as witnessed by the East Asian economies although these countries 
were selective on the type of FDI. (Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, (2010). Therefore, in 
order to steer industrialisation process, linkages creation in the mineral industry 
should allow for a conducive environment for innovation and technology transfer to 
take place, for example, adopting public policy that integrates the private sector in 
development objectives. Also, the availability of information and knowledge in the 
contemporary world could mean that industrialisation and the overall economic 
development can be achieved in a more efficient and sustainable ways in contrast to 
earlier industrialisation of the West that was mainly based on destruction and plunder 
of resources. 
	  
3.5. Conclusion. 
	  
Since mineral resources are finite (Jourdan, 2012) (Barma et al, 2012), it is crucial for 
Zimbabwe to optimise the resource wealth through the creation of economic linkages 
to resuscitate its economy and to attain long-term growth and economic development. 
As noted by Morris et al (2012), the industrial growth of the United States, Finland, 
Norway, and Australia was pioneered by commodity production that operated as a 
stepping-stone towards diversification and industrialisation. This suggests that mining 
can be a catalyst for broad-based economic development through promoting  
‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ linkages as well as knowledge and spatial linkages.  
However, the successful development of the minerals sector as a platform for 
economic recovery in Zimbabwe also depends on economic and political institutions, 
policy coordination, and the capacity of the government to implement an industrial 
policy that promotes beneficiation and industrial diversification. 
 
 
 
	   25 
Chapter 4. Policy Environment and the Political Economy Dynamics 
 
Introduction. 
 
This chapter discusses the institutional and ideological context within which the 
policy space for mineral resource extraction and linkages development is designed. 
This involves looking at policy frameworks and the political context in Zimbabwe, 
and how that impacts mineral development and linkages creation. Various policy 
measures, and legislation have been introduced in the mining sector as government 
attempts to turn the sector into a springboard to economic recovery. The other section 
of the chapter discusses the political dynamics that effect and influence stakeholder’s 
or actor’s actions in addressing national development goals. 
 
4.1. Government initiatives: policy instruments 
 
As mentioned earlier, the discovery of diamonds deposits, the rise of PGM mining as 
well as the need by the government to rise additional budgetary funds from mineral 
exports following the collapse of the economy forced the Zimbabwean government to 
undertake different policy initiatives. Various policy initiatives to turn the mining 
sector into a cornerstone for economic recovery have been undertaken including 
regional and national initiatives although the latter is given more prominence. 
Regional initiatives to which the government has subscribed to are Africa Mining 
Vision and Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). National policy 
initiatives include: 
 
(i) Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment policy. 
  
The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) (Chapter14: 33) was 
enacted in 2008. The Act, which seeks to address imbalances originating from the 
colonial era, stipulates that 51% of equity shares in all foreign owned companies must 
be in the hands of the indigenous Zimbabweans. This policy is not exclusive to 
foreign mining companies but to all foreign companies in all sectors (Chamber of 
Mines, 2009). From the 51%, 10% goes to Employee Share Ownership Trusts 
(ESOTs), another 10% goes to Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) and the 
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remaining 31% goes to indigenous investors (Mawowa, 2013). Tan Kock, (1995:38) 
contend that “the crucial role of the state in shaping and transforming class structure 
in a society is often ignored in the neo-classical and neo-liberal tradition – in spite of 
the fact that the pattern of ownership of productive assets often has profound impacts 
on production and growth”. In support of the above quote, in order to achieve long-
term economic development in emerging sectors, government interference in the 
allocation and ownership of the means of production is significant as manifested 
through the indigenisation policy. Previous policies on industrial development and 
mining did not make specific reference to changes in ownership structure and 
indigenous participation, empowerment and equal benefit of the country’s natural 
resources. The following figure shows the three broad trajectories of mineral regimes. 
 
Figure. 3. Three types of mineral regimes 
 
 
Source: Jourdan, 2014 
 
The indigenisation policy enacted by the government aspires to establish a ‘normal’ 
mining regime with high indigenous development (as shown in the figure above). The 
policy is clearly an attempt to transform the production structure of the economy. 
State ownership of natural resources is crucial for achieving national development 
objectives such as beneficiation of minerals and to create economic linkages. 
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Kadhani, (1986), argues that “…to what extent is it meaningful to plan an economy 
over which ownership and control of the productive assets reside in private hands and 
foreign private hands in large measure at that” (Kadhani, 1986:102). However, the 
success of the indigenisation policy is yet to be witnessed as its implementation has 
lacked consistency. The controversy that surrounds this policy is the timing. Most 
foreign companies argue that 51% equity on license renewal would be more 
attractive. The lack of capital in the economy entails that only a few indigenous 
people have access to the equity in the companies being indigenised. Most of these 
shares are then warehoused by the state.  
 
     (i)    The draft mineral policy 
The draft minerals development policy developed in 2013 by the Ministry of Mines 
and Mining Development defines the long-term developmental goals of the sector 
consistent with the country’s macro and micro economic objectives. The policy is a 
review of the mineral regime of the colonial era that was pro-settler (claim system) 
pro-corporate mineral extraction  (Jourdan, 2013). Thus, one of the objectives of the 
draft policy is to review the Mines and Mineral Act to come up with a new mines and 
minerals legislation that will unlock economic benefits from the country’s mineral 
resources. The policy aims to leverage the mineral sector for sustainable development 
of the country through linkages, (including beneficiation) and the development of a 
national competitive advantage, through knowledge-intensification, technology 
development and infrastructure development (Dhliwayo, 2014). The draft policy is yet 
to be finalised and this affects the management of the mineral sector and long-term 
investments planning (see chapter 1). However, the draft mineral policy has some 
grey areas that need to be addressed in order for the country to optimally benefit from 
its mineral resources. The policy mentioned the need for transparency, accountability, 
access to information and public participation and consultation without explicitly 
stating how these will be achieved, although the policy itself was developed through a 
nation-wide participatory process. 
 
(ii) The diamond policy 
The diamond policy was adopted in 2012. The policy is sector specific, introduced to 
increase government control on all diamonds produced in the country in line with the 
KPCS. The KPCS is the product of diamond producing countries of Southern Africa 
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who in 2000, came together to develop best practices to stop the trade in conflict 
diamonds that were fuelling civil wars and conflict in many African countries. From a 
regional initiative, it received the blessings of the United Nations later in 2000 (U.N. 
General Assembly, 2001). Efforts to uphold the KPCS minimum requirements by 
government show a positive picture towards improve mineral governance to achieve 
mining-led economic development in Zimbabwe. The policy mentions various 
provisions such as transparency and accountability, relocations and compensations 
and community participation (especially by traditional leaders who are government 
agents) (The Diamond Policy, 2012). The extent to which the policy addresses these 
issues is important since there is no previous explicit policy on diamonds in 
Zimbabwe. The policy also mentions beneficiation and value addition as significant in 
promoting linkages creation. The country currently export rough diamonds hence the 
policy’s emphasis on cutting and polishing of diamonds is critical for establishing 
downward linkages and employment creation. 
(iii) Community Share Ownership Trusts 
This scheme is a government initiative under the Indigenisation Policy that aims to 
compel mining companies to contribute to the development of the communities by 
ensuring that communities have shares in companies that mine resources in their 
areas. The proceeds from the shareholdings are invested back in community in which 
the companies operate (Parliament Report, 2015). Theoretical and empirical evidence 
show that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes favoured by extractive 
corporations do not contribute to the development of the host country and the 
communities in which mining operations takes place have remained poor (Lydall, 
2010), (Buur et al. 2013).  
 
Hence, in this regard trusts funds, if properly managed, through transparency and 
accountability, could be effective for transforming mining communities.  The 
advantage of community share ownership trust is that it provides social and economic 
benefits (like schools, hospitals and water boreholes) to the community other than 
local employment. However, reinvesting the resource wealth in mining communities 
alone could increase the inequality gap with the resource poor communities. The 
resource wealth should be therefore used to benefit all the indigenous people to 
achieve broader development. 
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(iv) The Sovereign Fund 
The Sovereign Wealth Fund of Zimbabwe Act was passed in 2014 and it seeks to 
establish a reserve fund to secure investment for the benefit of future generations of 
Zimbabweans. The Act is meant to support the objectives of the government that 
include long-term economic and social development, fiscal and macro – economic 
stabilization, and to supplement national revenue when it is low. The fund will be 
driven primarily by 25% of all royalties on mineral exports.  The establishment of the 
Fund is focused on the main argument that resource rents can be received in large 
quantities but they are also unstable due to price volatility leading to fiscal policy 
problems (Humphreys & Sandbu, (2007). Thus, the ‘booms and bust cycles’ have 
important policy implications regarding government fiscal expenditure and 
management and history has shown that it is not necessarily the presence of a resource 
fund that matters, rather it is the good economic expenditure policies that are adopted 
(Humphreys & Sandbu, 2007:194). SWF can be a window of opportunities for future 
mines as the funds can be used for exploration (geo-survey) and R&D projects. 
 
(v) The ZimAsset 
The ZimAsset is an ambitious industrial development policy that spelt out a number 
of measures to revive the economy including beneficiation of mineral resources that 
was not mentioned in prior mining development policies such as the Industrial 
Development policy. The ZimAsset policy blueprint was developed in 2013 and it is a 
deliberate attempt by government to promote development of mineral linkages, 
especially beneficiation and local procurement, which is consistent with the African 
Mining Vision. (Dhliwayo, 2014). The policy blue print also alludes to transparency 
and accountability in the mining sector, which is a positive step towards reducing 
corruption. However, the feasibility of the ZimAsset is challenged by lack of capital 
in the country.  
 
4.2. Fiscal revenue measures 
 
The government also introduced a number of fiscal measures to promote local 
beneficiation. In 2010 export tax on raw chrome was increased from 10% to 15% and 
a 10% quota on diamond production was reserved for local cutting and polishing. 
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(Midterm National Budget Statement: 2010). Exports of unrefined chrome and 
unrefined gold were banned in 2011 and 2014 respectively. However, the two year 
suspension (January 2015 to 2017) of 15% export tax for unrefined platinum 
(National Budget Statement: 2014) has been uplifted due to lack of unsatisfactory and 
concrete progress by platinum producers to build platinum base metals and precious 
metals refineries (The Herald: 2015). A platinum refinery is seen as inevitable by the 
government as this could be a vehicle to local beneficiation mainly in terms of 
providing feedstock for further value addition (catalysts, jewellery). The government 
is also considering the removal of 15% Value Added Tax (VAT) on local beneficiated 
diamonds to encourage beneficiation of minerals (Mining News, 2014). Although 
these fiscal policy instruments are important, however the government should also 
look at other incentives to encourage both foreign and local investors to build 
downstream processing and beneficiation plants. This includes investing in electricity 
supply, which is the lifeblood of a plant. Current electricity shortage in the country is 
a major disincentive to investors to set up value addition plants in the country as well 
as to mining itself.  
 
4. 3. The political economy dynamics 
	  	  
Political economy can be understood as the interrelationship between the political and 
economic processes. According to the Organisation for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD), political economy analysis is “concerned with the interaction 
of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and 
transform these relationships over time” (OECD as cited in Copestake & Williams, 
2012:1). Political economy analysis moves beyond the institutional quality and 
economic illiteracy (as in making bad / wrong economic policies) convectional 
analysis of natural resource development. Rather, it shows that development process 
is not linear, one that can be addressed by following a set of policy prescriptions 
without understanding the economic and political dynamics and interactions that 
influence and shape policy decisions, implementation and their outcomes (Frits, Levy 
& Rachel, 2014) (Amin, 2014) (Copestake & Williams, 2012). This study shows that 
actors’ or stakeholder’s actions, motivations, and power to influence the development 
outcome are different in each country (Copestake & Williams, 2012). Hence, it is 
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important to analyse the creation of linkages in the mining sector from a political 
economy perspective.  
 
 
Government’s slow pace in finalising the draft mineral policy and transferring into 
law is a reflection of the political economy dynamics. Beneficiation means reducing 
exports of raw minerals and imports of minerals sector inputs (local content). Other 
actors or government officials who have shares in mining companies are reluctant to 
radically shift to beneficiation (up- & downstream) due to lower returns on investment 
(ROI). Their interest is to maximise exports of raw materials to gain high returns on 
investment (resource rents), which is not in line with national objectives of 
beneficiating and value addition of the country’s mineral resources. It is thus, 
imperative to analyse the influence of institutional arrangements on stakeholders’ 
opportunities and incentives for action. (Copestake & Williams, (2012). 
 
In the Zimbabwean context, the indigenisation policy is not an ideological assertion, 
the pursuit of an alternative ideology or the rejection of capitalism.  Rather, it is a 
strategic policy designed to promote localisation (through ownership and control of 
the means of production) and the development of local capital (see figure 3 on 3-
trajectories), but the problems appears to lie in its implementation. Government 
agents lack the political will to successfully implement the policy hence the policy 
tends to benefit only a few elites who have political connections and access to capital 
and not the intended people. The policy is a relevant instrument, as resource-based 
industrialisation successes were almost all executed by local capital and not FDI. 
However, it needs proper implementation and expertise not only to optimise the 
mining industry but also to transform other economic sectors. 
 
Modern capitalism is driven by pursuit of self-interest that is individuals are obsessed 
with how much they are accumulating. Although Adam Smith argues that the pursuit 
of self-interest can result in economic efficiency through the ‘invisible hand’, this has 
not been the case given the rise of inequalities, environmental externalities and other 
economic costs left to societies and developing countries to shoulder (Stiglitz, 2007). 
The political economy dynamics in each country shape and influence the policy 
developments and their outcomes. 
	   32 
 
4.4. Policy inconsistency and unpredictability  
 
Policy frameworks and recommendations by governments to rectify certain tax 
system and profits levels of extractive companies are often unwelcomed and / or meet 
with resentment and fear of tampering with the investors confidence (Nkrumah, 
1965). Policy ‘unpredictability’ and ‘inappropriate policies’ in the mining industry 
have been echoed as the main obstacles to the growth of the sector. There are 
concerns that the government laws and policies are hostile to foreign mining 
companies (Dhliwayo, 2014). The ‘fast track’ land reform program and policy 
inconsistency coupled with economic downfall have created a crisis in confidence in 
mining as an investment sector.   In addition, the risk profile of the host country has 
been echoed as an important factor in attracting FDI (in terms of viable economic 
institutions and political stability). However, some empirical evidence shows that the 
number of exploration companies and the quality of the mineral resources 
(prospectivity) are more critical to foreign investors than the risk profile of the 
country (Barma et al, 2012). This is evidenced in some African countries like 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and also in oil rich countries such as Nigeria 
and Somalia that attract FDI despite sovereign risk. 
	  
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Continuing policy initiatives by the government show that there is policy space in 
Zimbabwe. These new policies and legislations seek to identify and bridge the gaps 
associated with previous industrial development and mining policies. Prior mining 
development policies such as Industrial Development Policy and the Minerals Act 
were not sufficient enough to address the dynamics of the mining industry and of 
development process. The colonial mining policies did not take into account the need 
to change ownership structure to promote indigenous entrepreneurs, local 
procurement and mineral beneficiation to create economic linkages as envisaged in 
the indigenisation policy. The new policies are premised on the idea of industrial 
policy to transform the mining sector through beneficiation and the promotion of 
domestic production.  However, implementation of the policies could be a challenge 
due to on-going political tensions. The conflict of interests and pursuit of self-
enrichment by local elites and government agents are major challenges to policy 
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consistency and successful implementation of economic policy. The political 
economy literature provided some crucial insights on political incentives that shape 
the actors decisions on policy making. The process of establishing linkages in the 
mineral sector is itself a matter of changing the production structure, ownership, and 
power relations that exist within the sector and this have significant implications to 
the political context in Zimbabwe. Therefore, it is important to analyse mining 
linkages development not only from an economic viewpoint but also from a political 
economy perspective. 
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Chapter 5. Research Findings and Discussion 
 
5.1. Findings: Introduction	  
 
This study carried out semi-structured interviews to analyse how the mineral sector 
can be optimised to achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth in Zimbabwe. 
A total number of nine respondents from different institutions were interviewed for 
this study. A total number of five stakeholders were interviewed from government 
institutions which are: Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (COMZ), the Ministry of 
Mines and Mining Development, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation 
(ZMDC), Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the National Mines Workers 
Union of Zimbabwe (NMWUZ). Three participants were from the policy think tanks, 
which are: Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU), the Institute of 
Mining Research (IMR) and Protect All Children Today (PACT). One Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) that is Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association 
(ZELA) participated in this study with three respondents interviewed at the same site. 
The sample size is fairly adequate for this small study. These institutions together 
with the informants were earmarked for their relevance and usefulness to the study 
due to their expertise in mineral sector. Most of the stakeholders that participated in 
the study were from government institutions and ministries that actively participate in 
mineral sector and economic development of the country. Desk top material, such as 
government reports, annual reports of government ministries and Non-Governmental 
Organisations formal documents were also used to assist in comparing primary data to 
determine consistency, conflict and areas of interest. 
 
5.2. Results  
	  
1. Creation of economic linkages (through beneficiation and value addition) in 
the mineral sector and across sectors is crucial for economic recovery in 
Zimbabwe. 
2. State capacity, political commitment and policy consistency is crucial for 
leveraging the mineral resources to anchor economic growth.  
3. Current political tensions in Zimbabwe are major challenges that weaken the 
case for establishing linkages based strategy. 
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5.3. Data Analysis 
 
Zimbabwe’s mining regime and its contribution to national economy (GDP). 
 
The mining policies of post-independence that were borrowed from colonial regime 
mainly focused on maximum extraction and on exports of raw minerals. However, 
these policy strategies led to two negative implications for the Zimbabwean economy. 
First, the prices of raw minerals were subject to cyclical price fluctuations, meaning 
that export revenues in the economy declined. Second, the continued reliance on raw 
materials for exports revenues led to slow or lack of industrialisation and 
diversification (Mandaza, (1986). The colonial mineral legislation was not amended 
to reflect a transition to post-independence era and to allow indigenous people 
(entrepreneurs) greater economic participation in the mineral extractive industry.  
 
Zimbabwe is rich in minerals that have a crucial industrial use that include steel, 
platinum, coal, polymers, copper, chromium and iron ore  (Chamber of Mines, 2013) 
(Jourdan et al, 2012). These minerals can be used in most manufacturing sector as 
feedstocks for domestic production and industrialisation (Jourdan et al, 2012). 
Statistics from the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe and Zimstat show that the mining 
sector is now the leading sector in terms of economic contribution. It contributes more 
than 15% of the country’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 58% of the 
national total exports, 13% of fiscal revenue, 50% of the current Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and more than 45,000 people are formally employed in the sector 
(Chamber of Mines, (2013).  
 
Table 1. Growth trends of economic sectors. 
Economic Sectors Actual Values Projected Values 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agriculture  37.6 7.2 1.4 7.8 -1.3 9 5.1 
Mining  18.9 37.4 24.4 8 6.5 11.4 9.2 
Manufacturing 17 2 13.8 5.3 1.5 3.2 6.5 
Finance & insurance 4.5 8.3 8.3 28 2.6 6.3 6.2 
Distribution 6.5 8.8 4.3 4.3 3.4 5.1 5 
GDP at Market Prices 5.4 11.4 11.9 10.6 3.4 6.1 6.4 
Source: Chamber of Mines, 2013. 
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The growth trends in the Table 1 above show that mining growth rate is increasing 
relative to other sectors. The mining sector contribution to GDP from 2009 to 2013 
has expanded relative to other sectors and economic activities of comparison. The 
2014 and 2015 period show the projected values of the mining sector contribution to 
GDP in comparison with other economic sectors. Overall, the growth trends reflect 
that the mining sector contribution to GDP is relatively large and increasing. Table 2 
below shows the contribution of total mineral exports from 1993 to 2012. 
 
Table 2. Contribution of mining to total mineral exports  
 
 
Source: Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, the mining sector share of contribution to GDP growth has 
surpassed both agriculture and manufacturing. In table 2, the PGMs in 2012 were the 
largest contributors of mineral exports (exports revenues) followed by gold and 
diamonds. The HCF stands for Hydro Carbon Fuels (oil and gas). With these growth 
trends, the sector has potential to grow through rents capture, royalties and linkages 
formation. However, infrastructure (power, transport, water) is arguably the greatest 
constraint to an extension of the mineral sector. 
Taxation regime  
All tax evaluation and collection is done by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
(ZIMRA) that replaced the Ministry of Finance Income Tax Department in 2002. The 
 ! Contribution to Total Mineral 
Exports !
1993-2003 (%)! 2004-2011 (%)! 2012  (%) !
Gold! 57.3! 24.2! 26.9%!
HCF! 20! 10.7! 8.6%!
Nickel! 15.1! 11.0! 0.7!
PGMS*! 2.3! 46.1! 27.2%!
Diamonds! 0.8! 6.7! 26.1%!
Others! 6.8%! 1.3%! 10.5%!
9 
RBZ, MOF, Zimstats 
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institution is mandated with the administration of the mining tax code and issues tax 
revenue reports based on tax heads (Value Added Tax, Pay As You Earn, Corporate 
Income Tax, withholding taxes, royalties, capital gain tax among other taxes). The 
ministry plays an important role in capturing revenue earnings as well as monitoring 
and implementing beneficiation policy of government in taxation of unbeneficiated 
platinum and rough diamonds.  A consistent  tax regime is preferable since it can 
attract or repels investments (both domestic and foreign investments). It is also 
important to note that there are various government agencies administering non-tax 
mineral charges like ZMDC and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe 
(MMCZ). The two are state-owned enterprises. This can contribute to confusion and 
inconsistency in revenue projections when two or more actors are involved as noted 
by the interviewees. Hence, there is strong need for institutional coordination and 
transparency among the three ministries to successfully capture the resource revenues. 
 
 However, concerns about lack of transparency in these institutions have been raised. 
Interview respondents note that without transparency it will be difficult to access 
information on how much revenues are generated from the mining sector and how 
these revenues are being used. Transparency is also crucial in revenue projections as 
this can help to address suspicion between government and mining industry regarding 
issues of transfer pricing, re-invoicing and under-costing. The major challenge facing 
ZIMRA is the illicit trade of diamonds that started in Marange in 2006 after the 
discovery of alluvial diamonds. The following two figures show the current and the 
envisaged revenue collection system in Zimbabwe. 
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Figure. 4.  The current revenue collection system. 
 
 
 
Source: T. Farawo, (2014). www.sarwatch .org 
 
Figure. 5. The proposed mineral revenue collection 
 
 
 
Source: T. Farawo, (2014). www.sarwatch .org 
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License contracts and taxation policy are crucial tools for the government to secure 
maximum rents, depending on the geological prospectivity of Zimbabwe. Interview 
respondents emphasise that the government must invest in geological information 
(geo-survey) to determine quality and quantity of the mineral deposits as this 
enhances the bargaining power of the government in negotiating contracts with 
investors. They argue that this is important given that often times investors have more 
information on mineral reserves than the state. Allocation of licences by the 
government is also important, as this can be a major way of gaining capital 
(resources) or government revenues that are crucial for public spending. Thus various 
forms of allocating mineral concession can be used, for example, competitive bidding, 
negotiated deals and sealed bidding (auction). 
 
Linkages creation 
The  (PGM) value chain 
Figure 6. The PGM value chain 
Source: Jourdan, (2012, 2014). 
Platinum or the Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) are made up of six metals (platinum, 
palladium, ruthenium, rhodium, iridium and osmium as shown in figure 6. PGM’s are 
mainly used to manufacture auto-catalysts (53%), jewellery (20%), electronics (11%), 
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medical applications and dental alloys (6%) and chemical catalysts (6%).  Platinum is 
in high demand due to increasing demand from the emerging economies like China 
and India (Kaplinsky, 2011) (Barma et al, 2012). Zimbabwe holds the second largest 
platinum reserves after South Africa (Chamber of Mines, 2013). Zimplats, Unki and 
Mimosa are the current platinum mines in Zimbabwe producing about 430,000 ounces 
annually (Chamber of Mines, 2013). Currently, the country exports its platinum as 
raw concentrate or matte. Interview respondents noted that beneficiation of platinum 
value chain offers potential for linkages creation in the mining sector and across other 
economic sectors. However, the availability of geological survey of known platinum 
reserves is important for investors to invest in platinum plant in host country. 
The Steel value chain 
The steel value chain is critical for industrial development as illustrated in the figure 7 
below. Coal and iron-ore are the key inputs in steel production However, iron and 
steel production in Zimbabwe ceased at ZISCO since 2007 due to economic 
meltdown. The respondents pointed out that this has led to higher demand of imports 
for manufacturing (machinery and equipment), job losses and reduction in steel 
revenues.  
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Figure 7. The Iron and Steel Outcome.
 
Source: Beneficiation Strategy for the minerals industry of South Africa, 2011. 
 
Themes 
The key themes picked out from the results are firstly, the importance of beneficiation 
and value addition of mineral resources. Secondly, local content is key to linkages 
creation. And thirdly, political tensions affect the prospect of establishing linkages 
based strategy. These themes reflect some important consistency in data and also 
show areas of interest among respondents (and the institutions) on how to achieve 
economic linkages and the challenges to linkages creation in Zimbabwe.   
	  
5.4.  Discussion Section 
	  	  
This study investigated how the mineral resources can be optimised to achieve 
economic recovery and sustainable growth. The results of the findings show that the 
establishment of linkages based strategy is a viable path to achieve economic recovery 
and sustainable growth in Zimbabwe. Beneficiation and value addition not only 
increase and stabilize the export value of mineral commodities, but also have a 
positive multiplier effect on the macro-economy through local employment creation, 
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The challenge for the interdepartmental team is to facilitate the beneficiation of these ferrous 
minerals to the final stages of the value chain, as outlined in the Figure 2 below: 
 
FIGURE 2: IRON AND STEEL STRATEGIC OUTCOME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventions for iron and steel value chain development: 
Address import-parity pricing of iron ore and steel for downstream users to support the final 
fabrication process. Measures to achieve this end could include taxes on exports and 
conditionalities linked to the provision of infrastructure.  
 
Develop strategies to address other constraints on downstream steel fabrication, including 
identifying major opportunitie  for using st el for local product , for inst nce for elements of 
capital equipment and construction inputs. Where appropriate, the st te should assist with 
industrial financing. These measures require close collaboration between the Dti, the DMR and 
EDD.  
• Invoke regulatory provisions to ensure sustainable and developmentally priced input mineral 
commoditi s f r new and existing steel manufacturers in South Africa 
• Investigate mechanisms to protect and support the competitiveness of existing intermediary 
plants, such as ferro-chrome smelters 
• Encourage investment into South African steel industry to break prevailing anti-competitive 
behaviour of current operators 
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knowledge and capacity building in upstream and downstream industries, 
diversification of the economy, and the industrialization of the whole economy.  
 
5.4.1. Backward linkages (Upstream value addition) 
There is an assumption that backward linkages have great potential for 
industrialisation arising from ‘localisation’  (in the form of local ownership in the 
commodity producer) and local content policies (Kaplinsky, 2011). Local content 
measures are aimed at increasing local employment and procurement from domestic 
suppliers in the minerals value chain.  Thus, local content policies generally are 
designed to build the capacity of domestic companies to become more competitive in 
the long run.  
Much of Zimbabwe’s mineral capital goods are imported and some capital goods 
companies have shut down partly due to the disinvestment of other mining companies 
such Anglo American and Lonrho, which used to invest in a plethora of up- and 
downstream industries. Mining license should attach conditions for local content  
(local value-added) targets. In an (OECD) Development Centre policy brief, Havro & 
Santiso (2008) point out that both Norway and Chile experienced: 
“…direct efforts to diversify their economy and to support industries 
associated with the natural-resource sector – such as engineering and supply 
– as well as non-resource sectors. Norwegian policies in the 1970s were 
markedly interventionist in this regard . . . The legal framework emphasised 
local content until 1990, to develop the infant petroleum supply industry. 
Norway also pushed for state participation in the same areas, in spite of 
reluctance on the part of many of the international companies.” 
 
Research interviewees also note that local content needs to be based on the local value 
added contained in the goods and services supplied. They argue that government 
intervention through credit facility, tax exemptions and subsidies can also strengthen 
and deepen local content in domestic supplies in the economy. 
The on-going production requires service inputs (apart from material inputs) for 
example, repair, engineering and maintenance that build industrial capabilities. For 
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example, advanced IT-technology in mining extraction could improve skills and 
efficiency thereby reducing the cost of production in the long term. In order for 
Zimbabwe to benefit from its natural resources, the license contracts should make 
provisions for local content, corporate skills formation and R&D spending. However, 
protectionist policies such as ‘infant industry’ protection can also be imposed to 
protect the domestic suppliers and to reduce imports of mineral inputs. The 
protectionist policies can be lifted or reduced once the domestic supply industry has 
gained the competitive advantage from knowledge and technology transfer (Amsden, 
1994).  
5.4.2. Forward (downstream) linkages 
Forward linkages consist of downstream value addition (mineral beneficiation). 
Minerals such as ferrochrome, iron ore, gold, copper and platinum have potential for 
creating downward linkages mainly with manufacturing sector. Most of the interview 
respondents argue that in order to unlock the full benefits of platinum and to develop 
downward-processing linkages (as illustrated in figure 6 above) there is need to invest 
in a platinum refinery. PGM’s are “high tech” metals, which require advanced 
technological skills to beneficiate. However, some respondents have argued that 
investing in a platinum plant might not be cost effective (from an investor’s point of 
view) given the low production levels of platinum in the country. Thus, it is cheaper 
for platinum producers to refine the concentrate in large South African refineries 
where their marginal cost is lower. Another disincentive to invest in a refinery is that 
the PGM value chain is highly concentrated because platinum mining producers 
supply their raw PGM concentrate to PGM downstream manufacturers, for example 
BASF, hence there is no incentive for foreign investors to invest in a cost refinery 
project. 
The idea behind linkages creations (through beneficiation and value addition) is to 
industrialise by empowering the local people since foreign investors have no incentive 
to industrialise in host countries. The main objective of foreign mining investors is to 
secure an optimal lease contract that maximises returns on investments (ROI). Thus, 
there is conflict of interest between the private foreign companies and the state. These 
dynamics have major policy implications on state policy. The government has to 
provide greater incentives and disincentives for foreign mining companies to invest in 
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a refinery (either to provide huge tax exemptions to beneficiate domestically or to 
impose a higher export tax on raw PGM concentrate/matte. 
 
Diamonds 
Zimbabwe is ranked among the top producers of rough diamonds such as South 
Africa and Botswana (Dhliwayo, 2014). This is due to the discovery of diamond 
reserves in Chiadzwa in 2006 and its increasing share of contribution to the country’s 
total mineral exports as shown in table 2 above. Interview respondents argue that 
despite Zimbabwe being one of the top diamond producers globally, the country has 
not captured significant revenues and downward linkages from its exploitation of 
diamonds.  Lack of beneficiation and value addition to create downward linkages in 
Zimbabwe is also witnessed in the diamonds sector (Centre for Natural Resources 
Governance, 2013). Most of the diamonds are exported as rough diamonds at a lower 
price value. However, the Zimbabwe Diamond Policy enacted in 2012 makes 
provisions for the government to reserve quota of all the diamonds produced in 
Zimbabwe for local cutting and polishing and jewellery manufacturing to encourage 
indigenous entrepreneurs. Efforts to beneficiate and value add the diamonds through 
cutting and polishing has been perfunctory. Some respondents argued that this is due 
to lack of political will by government agents and policy makers to implement 
economic policies.  
The production capacity in the diamond sector is focused to go down due to the 
increase in cost of production and the depletion of alluvial resources. Most of the 
deposits in Chiadzwa are kimberlite diamonds, which are capital intensive.  Recently 
the government has proposed to merge all the diamond mining firms into a single 
entity in a deliberate attempt to rescue the industry as most of the miners operating in 
Chiadzwa lack the sophisticated machinery for deep underground extraction 
(Mining.com, 2015). The government will own 50% of the shares making it the major 
shareholder of the conglomerate. The move to merge the diamond firms is arguably a 
positive arrangement from the point of view that the government will have ownership 
and control of diamond production. This move is also seen as important and long 
overdue by looking to successful experiences of Botswana. However, it should be 
highlighted that development is not about replicating what others have done because 
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the socio-economic and political contexts and institutions of countries vary as well as 
the actor’s motivations and political incentives (Amsden, 1994). The success of the 
diamond industry in Zimbabwe depends on visionary leadership and political will of 
the actor’s to serve the interests of the country. 
Gold 
Zimbabwe has enjoyed positive downstream beneficiation of gold that takes place 
through Fidelity Refineries  (Chamber of Mines, 2013). Gold production increased 
from 3.6 tons in 2008 to a massive 14.7 tons in 2012. The rise in production output 
was partly due to the introduction of multi-currency in 2009 (Chamber of Mines, 
2013).  Artisanal and small-scale gold miners contribute significantly to production 
output in Zimbabwe. Government intervention to equip these miners is crucial for 
sustainable development and to include the artisanal miners into the mainstream 
economy. The government also needs to resuscitate the exiting gold mines and 
refineries in order to increase output and create employment. Interview respondents 
noted that in order to establish more downstream linkages from mining with other 
sectors particularly manufacturing, the government needs to resuscitate the existing 
mines for example, Hwange Colliery Company, Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting 
Company (ZIMASCO) for ferrochrome, Shabani and Mashaba mines – for asbestos 
production, ZISCO now called NewZim Steel – for iron and steel production, Bindura 
Nickel Corporation – for nickel production. With resuscitation of the mines and 
increased investment in resource mapping and geodata acquisition, government can 
effectively stimulate linkages creation in mining industry with other sectors and 
restore the economy. 
Steel 
Steel production is crucial for the establishment of forward (downstream) linkages in 
the manufacturing sector. Interview respondents noted that the resuscitation of 
(ZISCO) (now called NewZim Steel of a joint venture between government and Essar 
Africa Holdings) is critical for developing downwards linkages and to revive the 
economy. Steel production has potential for value addition, employment creation, 
skills development and technological innovation as illustrated by the Iron and Steel 
Outcome figure 7 above. Failure by the government to consummate the ZISCO Steel 
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takeover deal with Essar signed in 2011 (The Source, 2015) clearly shows a gap in the 
Mines and Minerals Act to provide for beneficiation and value addition as condition 
for license granting. Studies have shown that the current emerging economies have 
steel-related manufacturing sectors (NUMSA Beneficiation Strategy, 2012). As 
observed by Jourdan, 2012, resource contracts need to provide incentives or 
disincentives for mineral resources downstream beneficiation.  
5.4.3. Spatial (sidestream) linkages 
There is a growing emphasis on linking up mining infrastructure with economic 
growth planning. That is mining infrastructure should provide opportunities of 
linkages with other sectors such as agriculture, forestry and service sector (Di Bascio, 
Slade & Ward, 2014).  The argument is that mining companies should explore other 
innovative ways to develop infrastructure and this means embracing participatory 
economic planning beyond mining (Di Bascio, Slade & Ward, 2014).  Government 
intervention through public infrastructure investment and policy will strengthen and 
deepen these horizontal linkages. Most respondents pointed out that Zimbabwe has a 
huge infrastructure gap particularly energy (electricity) that is vital for the functioning 
of mining industry. The country needs to invest in coal thermal power station, 
increase electricity output from Kariba dam and import more electricity to sustain the 
economy. Some interview respondents argue that mining infrastructure development 
should generate spillovers into other sectors and this could be achieved through public 
and private investment. Effort to upgrade transport infrastructure has been limited by 
lack of fiscal capital.  
5.4.4. Fiscal linkages 
 
Fiscal management of national resource rents determines whether a country is able to 
successfully reinvest its resource rents into assets such as physical capital, human 
capital and wealth reserves assets that will sustain the economy when the natural 
resources are extinct (Kaplinsky, 2011). Hirschman pointed out that achieving fiscal 
linkage is difficult because there are no criteria on which sector to invest. Hence, in 
order to maximize the fiscal linkages for economic development, the state must 
possess both the capacity to capture rents and to reinvest productively (Kaplinsky, 
2011), (Jourdan, 2012). The need to monitor exchange rates appreciation and the 
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ability to implement counter-cyclical macro-economic polices in respond to price 
volatility also call for a strong fiscal management in mineral rich nations (Kaplinsky, 
2011).  
 
Most of the interview respondents agree that capital injection is of key importance in 
terms of investments. Many respondents share the same view that the fiscal budgetary 
constraint and energy constraint are the main obstacle limiting the development of the 
mining industry in Zimbabwe. These views are supported by the underutilisation of 
some of the mines such as the Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company 
(ZIMASCO), Shabanie Mines, Mashaba Mines, Hwange Colliery Company and 
Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) (Chamber of Mines, 2013). The lack of 
production and capital has also led to the shutdown of other mines including: Bindura 
Nickel Corporation, Madziwa Nickel Mines, and Mhangura Copper Mines (Chamber 
of Mines, 2013).  
 
Some of the respondents interviewed in this study raised concerns on the feasibility of 
beneficiation in Zimbabwe. Currently the economy needs a massive capital injection 
to stabilise its fiscal crisis and to grow the mining industry as highlighted in the 
ZimAsset report (National Budget Statement, 2013). Interview respondents also 
highlight that in order to maximise resource revenues the license contracts should 
attach conditions for renegotiation of the contracts when commodity prices are 
increasing due to higher demand. The AMV also note that there should be tax 
instruments that self-adjust such as a Resource Rent Tax (RRT) for countries to gain 
more from their natural resources  (AMV as cited in Batida & Ericsson, 2014), 
(Jourdan, 2012). Some respondents argue that the ZimAsset is an ambitious policy 
that recognises the importance of beneficiation in promoting forward linkages in the 
mining sector but the chronic shortages of state financing and energy constraints limit 
its implementation. 
 
 Most of the interviewees share the same view that policy consistency and a 
favourable political environment increase investment confidence. The argument is 
that foreign investors are suspicious of Zimbabwe’s political situation since the land 
reform process started in early 2000. They express the view that the legal and policy 
frameworks in the mining sector are unattractive to foreign capital and investors. This 
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unattractiveness of the policy regime in the mining industry is constraining investors 
from making long-term investment commitments. Thus, it negatively impacts on the 
growth rate of the economy due to limited capital inflows from investments. 
	  
5.5. Limitations 
 
The data collection method used to contact this research (semi-structured interviews) 
has some limitations on the outcome of the research. The major limitation of this 
study was the constitution / composition of the sample. The sample had a few private 
institutions and NGOs. This might have biased the results as these institutions could 
have different opinions regarding mineral extraction and linkages creation through 
beneficiation. Also, the views of the respondents and the economic ideologies held by 
the interviewed institutions may not necessarily represent the views of the state on 
how the mineral sector should be optimised for economic recovery. However, desktop 
material on mineral resource extraction and beneficiation was used to supplement the 
primary data and to minimise any bias.  
 
This discussion section has analysed the results of the findings. The analysis of 
linkages creation in the mining sector and across other sectors offers a promising 
development path to revive the Zimbabwean economy and achieve sustainable 
growth. However, concrete linkages development and ultimate economic recovery 
fundamentally depends on government capacity and political commitment, which 
remains a challenge in the midst of political tensions. The discussion section has also 
showed that the resource curse thesis and mineral linkages development discourse 
connect with entire new literature on beneficiation that paints a different picture to our 
understanding of mineral extraction. The literature offers a plausible analysis on value 
addition of minerals that could address the resource curse problem in mineral 
abundant countries by diversifying and expanding the economic sectors through 
linkages creation.  
	  
5.6. Policy implications 
	  
This analysis holds some important policy implications for Zimbabwe’s future. 
Leveraging of the mineral resources includes adopting strategic and pragmatic 
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policies such as beneficiation that ensure that the economy grows internally and also 
builds competitive advantage. The nature and effects of natural resources on 
economic and political outcomes especially in developing countries often give rise to 
various policy implications for governments. The volatility of mineral prices has a 
profound effect on government fiscal planning but most importantly it highlights 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the economy. Lower commodity prices or the 
fluctuations in the value of the natural resource produced will lead to reduction in tax 
revenue and royalties (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007).  
 
The shortage of capital in the country undoubtedly affects the running of the economy 
and the ability of the government to effectively plan and implement its economic 
goals. Borrowing has also become extremely difficult as it often depends on the 
ability of the country to demonstrate a secure revenue base (Karl, 2007). Hence under 
these circumstances, it is crucial to note that the government has to make some trade 
offs in order to attract foreign investors to gain capital (Jourdan, 2013). The argument 
is that resource extraction involves some trade offs such as environmental degradation 
and community relocations, and the impact on various groups within a country 
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz, 2007). However, it should be noted that the kinds of 
trade-offs depend on the level of economic development and developmental priorities 
of each country that inform policy choice. 
 
That being said, the government should identify policies that are instrumental in 
attracting FDI. This entails looking at how the government uses contractual 
arrangements to reflect the national objectives and to cope with price volatility 
(Barma et al, 2012). However, Zimbabwe has been very critical about FDI. This has 
contributed to policy inconsistency on FDI as once argued by Chimbombe, (1986). In 
her interesting essay edited by Mandaza (1986) she discussed the country’s 
ambivalence towards foreign investors and pointed that this has been a hindrance to a 
clear definition of the role of foreign capital in serving Zimbabwe’s planned goals 
Chimombe, (1986). The country is suspicious of foreign capital and has been unable 
to offer convincing guarantees to attract FDIs.  
 
Foreign investors have the power to exert pressure on national governments because 
they are financially powerful and they have access to knowledge which make them a 
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threat to national states (Hamphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz, 2007). Also foreign investors’ 
interests are often not in alignment with that of individual states of attaining national 
development. This entails that the government must constantly monitor and regulate 
the activities of foreign investors, as well as aligning their interest with national goals 
by making mandatory provisions for the creation of backward and forward linkages 
on license granting system. 
 
The issue of transparency in the mining sector has been highly echoed by ZELA and 
other think tanks such as PACT. Transparency has been presented as instrumental for 
civil participation, addressing corruption, by providing some checks and balance on 
government operations and paving way to mutual contractual agreements between 
government and private companies (Karl. 2007). However, one can contend that 
transparency, while supposedly provides civil participation and openness in license 
negotiations, can be used as a weapon through which powerful private companies use 
to advance their private self-interests as opposed to national interests. Transparency 
has replaced the conventional norms of democracy and good governance.  
 
Reforms in economic and political institutions, transparency and anti-corruption 
measures are necessary but not sufficient for leveraging the mineral resources in 
Zimbabwe. In fact, many developing nations and Africa in particular, have since 
argued that advocating for a certain governance system and specific democratic 
institutions is another form of colonisation. Although it is generally acknowledged 
that ‘right’ institutions and good governance assist mineral-rich countries to escape 
the resource curse, it does not necessarily mean that the adoption of the prescribed 
democracy will automatically result in economic growth. (Barma, et al, 2014). 
Institutions arise out of historical political settings and the establishment of effective 
institutions “requires coming to grips with the political underpinnings and the drivers 
that shape how institutions develop and how decisions are made as well as how de 
jure institutions are used de facto” (Fritz, Levy & Rachel, 2014:2-3). In light of the 
above, it should be noted that institutions are effective to a certain extend. The 
political economy literature paints a different picture. It attempts to move beyond the 
‘context factors’ and argues that we need to place actors in their immediate strategic 
context that shapes their decision-making that ultimately, moulds economic outcomes. 
That is, it is not always about having the ‘right institutions’ but it is also about 
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providing political incentives and opportunities to influence policy implementation 
and economic outcomes. 
 
However, the analysis of the interviews and desk top study material on the 
Zimbabwean situation mirrored what other studies have shown: that mineral abundant 
countries are prone to resource curse problem and slow economic growth  (Arezki & 
Van der Ploeg, 2010; Collier & Goderis, 2007 and Lydall, 2007).) Insights from 
interviews and secondary data show that availability of mineral endowments and the 
institutional and socio-political context in Zimbabwe weaken the case for applying 
economic linkages based strategy due to the current political tensions. The political 
contestation in the country is not only weakening the institutions, resulting in policy 
inconsistency and corruption but it is also making political gains more appealing than 
economic development. Both the socio-political and economic institutional 
arrangements are not neutral but are fundamentally intertwined. This entanglement of 
economic institutions with political institutional arrangements hinders the successful 
creation of linkages development and economic recovery. 
 
 5.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed how the mineral beneficiation and value addition of the 
mineral resources can create linkages based strategy to catalyse economic recovery in 
Zimbabwe. The data analysis section has presented how the mineral resources can 
facilitate linkages creation and the discussion section has analysed the results of the 
findings. Insights from the interviews and desktop analysis show that linkages 
creation through beneficiation of mineral resources has potential to revive the 
economy. The discussion section shows that literature on mineral beneficiation and 
value addition offers a plausible explanation on how to achieve economic growth in 
resource rich countries. The policy implications section has reflected that mineral 
extraction is a challenging development process that requires collaboration and 
dedication among actors on policy design and implementation. The prevailing 
political situation in the country is a major obstacle for linkages formation. Thus, 
Zimbabwe needs a strong leadership with the political will and capacity to implement 
the policies, such as industrial policies to transform the mining sector and revive the 
troubled economy.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1. Summary of Chapters 
Zimbabwe has been awash in resource discoveries in recent years. The prospect of 
these mineral resources appears to offer the country a renewed sense of hope in the 
wake of continued economic crisis post land-reform programme. This study started by 
analysing the neoclassical explanation of resource dependency and slow growth in 
resource-rich countries. Literature review on neoclassical economics in chapter 2 
reviewed that resource curse is inevitable in resource dependency countries due to 
internal factors such as lack of functional institutions, corruption, non-transparency, 
rent seeking behaviour, Dutch disease and wrong policies like protectionist policies 
and industrial policy. Neoclassical economists policy solutions to the resource curse 
problem of institutional reform often miss the underlying political economy dynamics 
in different countries. 
 
The political economy literature on linkages creation in chapter 3 highlighted that 
linkages creation through mineral beneficiation can be a stepping-stone towards 
broad-base economic growth. Chapter 4 presented, among others, strategic policies 
that seek to restructure the mining sector and facilitate linkages creation across 
economic sectors. The political economy dynamics literature provided important 
insights on the resource curse problem in mineral resource abundance countries. The 
literature shows that the resource curse problem is not always caused by internal 
factors of weak institutions, weak policies, corruption and rent-seeking behaviour.  
Rather, it can be caused by other factors beyond ‘functional’ institutions that include 
incentives and opportunities influencing the actors’ choice to commit to the 
development of society. Thus, the political risk within a country impede on the 
successful implementation of linkages based strategy to steer economic growth. The 
results of the findings presented in chapter 5 reviewed that creating linkages based 
strategy could be a development path to economic recovery in Zimbabwe. However, it 
appears that the current political tensions, policy environment and fiscal shortages in 
the country are the overriding obstacles for economic linkages to materialise.  
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In conclusion, the optimisation of mineral resources through the establishment of 
linkages presents a huge potential for economic recovery in Zimbabwe. However, 
what the analysis presented in the previous chapter is that the political turmoil 
characterising Zimbabwe has profound impact on how the government co-ordinate 
and regulate economic activities. Mineral extraction is a challenging development 
process that requires a strong state with oversight powers and capacity to regulate 
economic institutions to achieve economic transformation. Political tension and policy 
inconsistency in the country makes it difficult to leverage more opportunities for local 
people in the mining sector.  
 
Insights from the interviews and desktop study highlight that in order for Zimbabwe 
to leverage its mineral resources economic recovery and sustainable growth, there is 
need to establish economic linkages. This means that the government has to play a 
leading role in directing and supporting the mining sector and other key economic 
sectors such as manufacturing in creating linkages. This involves strategic 
intervention that include the implementation of industrial policies and provision of 
subsidies, for example, to ensure structural transformation of the economy by 
promoting domestic production through beneficiation process. This intervention 
should also ensure strategic policy coherence within economic sectors and 
coordination of various departments such as manufacturing, and infrastructure sectors 
to effectively establish linkages and economic diversification.  
 
A shift towards a progressive policy regime presents significant steps by the 
government to transform and improve the production capacity of the mining industry. 
The diamond policy has played a major role in facilitation the emergence of 
indigenous mining entrepreneurs and employment in the diamond industry. The 
indigenisation policy has so far led to minimal success in ownership transfer due to 
conflict of interests between government and foreign companies and lack of capital to 
acquire mining company shares. The deepening of the mineral sector linkages into the 
domestic economy through beneficiation of these resources and creating supplier and 
service industries around the minerals sector is crucial for reviving Zimbabwe’s 
economy. This critically dependents on the state capacity (Collier & Goderis, 2007) to 
invest in infrastructure, human skills, R&D and to ensure that the development of 
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mineral beneficiation and value addition is part of the national industrialisation 
strategy. However, the current political contestations in the country is negatively 
impacting on the successful implementation of economic policy and commitment to 
economic resuscitation, and if remain unsolved, will make economic linkages creation 
very complex. 
 
6.1 Recommendations 
1. Resource extraction activity should be developed as an anchor of economic 
linkages with other sectors so that the when the finite resources are depleted the 
economy will continue to grow in other sectors using the skills and infrastructure put 
in by reinvesting the resource rents and establishing the linkages. 
 2 a). The government should invest in energy  (electricity) and infrastructure for 
successfully linkages formation. Mining infrastructure is an important catalyst for 
development with other sectors such as agriculture and forestry. Also, Zimbabwe is a 
land-locked country and it has access to ports via Mozambique and South Africa. 
Collaboration in infrastructure investments with these countries is imperative in order 
for Zimbabwe to alleviate logistical costs of infrastructure. 
b). The government should invest in upgrading skills and RDI (skills capability) that 
support and deepen linkages in the economy. 
c). The government should also ensure that the indigenisation act is implemented in 
order to encourage local context and indigenous entrepreneurs (grow local capital). 
This can be achieved by providing access to capital for indigenous people to acquire 
equity shares in the mining sector in line with the objectives of the indigenisation 
policy.  
d). The government should concretise its progressive mining policies through 
effective laws and regulations. 
e). The government and other stakeholders should aim to address the political 
economy dynamics facing the country through collaboration, political inclusive and 
effective engagement.  
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3. The study recommends future research on the impact of the resource curse theory 
on achieving economic development. That is: to what extent and with what 
consequences does the theory’s political, economic and ideological manifestations 
constitutes structural limitations on the developmental momentum of Africa? 
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Appendix 
 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
Key Questions. 
 
 
1. Is mining becoming a major sector to the Zimbabwean economy? 
 
2. If yes to 1, how and why do you believe that mining is becoming a larger 
contributing sector to the economy? 
 
3. Which are the mineral resources of strategic importance in Zimbabwe?  
 
4. What does it take for a country to be able to use its mineral deposits to achieve 
economic and social development? 
 
5. The draft minerals development policy is very significant in terms of addressing 
important factors within the mining industry such as rents capture, licence issuance 
and mineral value addition. Why was this draft mining policy needed and do you 
think that this policy will be implemented? 
 
6. How will this mining policy improve the mineral sector if enacted by the 
government? 
 
7. What are your thoughts on the increasing state involvement in the mining industry? 
  
8. How can the government implement development policies that can leverage the 
mineral resources for economic recovery and long-term growth? 
 
9. Part of the increased total value exports is due to higher global prices mainly of 
platinum and diamonds; do you think that the demand for these minerals will 
increase? 
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 10. What other policy strategies do you think the government should implement in 
the industry that can accelerate economic recovery. 
 
11. What are the likely challenges that could prevent the mining industry from 
reaching its full potential? Or what are the challenges to mineral beneficiation in the 
country. 
 
12. Many authors share the same argument that resource dependent countries have 
slow economic development due to corruption and rent seeking by government 
officials, particularly in Africa, what are your views on this? 
 
13. What is an optimal environment for attracting foreign investment in the mining 
sector? 
 
14. Increasing environmental awareness and the prevalence of anti-mining sentiments 
have led to a huge impact on the mining industry. Is this not going to impede on the 
growth of the industry? 
 
15. How do we strike a balance between the interests of the mining companies, the 
government and the local people?  
 
16. What policies are in place to ensure that beneficiation and value addition takes 
place in mining sector? 
 
17. Do we have adequate transport and energy infrastructure to make the mining 
industry the driver of economic recovery? 
 
 
Names of Interviewed Institutions 
 
1. Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (COMZ). 
2.  Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. 
3. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC).   
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4. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA).  
5. Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU). 
6.  Institute of Mining Research (IMR).  
7.  Protect All Children Today (PACT).   
8. Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA).  
9. National Mines Workers Union of Zimbabwe (NMWUZ). 
 
